CONTENTS 1 Men Failing at Feminism and the Exception of Condorcet 2 Misogyny of the Philosophes, Stewards of the Status Quo 3 Condorcet’s Feminist Writing 4 Condorcet’s Personal Relationships and Why He Became a Feminist 5 Condorcet’s Legacy Among the Philosophes    and the Value of His Feminism for Today’s Man   APPENDIX A Question of Terms: Feminist Over Pro-Feminist The 18th Century Clamor for Gender Equality: Forefathers and Foremothers of Contemporary Feminism The Early Struggle for Gender Equality: A Timeline About the Author/Works Cited

"Condorcet’s Legacy among the Philosophes and the Value of his Feminism for Today’s Man," Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism, 2008. (PDF article via essaysinhumanism.org)

Misogyny of the Philosophes, Stewards of the Status-Quo

While many Enlightenment authors bemoaned the sad state of women’s place in society, very few spoke up for the most reasonable remedy: their participation in the political process. As Roy Porter puts it, beyond generally supporting the notion “that women ought to be treated as rational creatures,” the “philosophes did not generally commit themselves to the general emancipation of women as men’s equals. While they complained against prejudice and injustice, hardly any women thought in terms of enfranchisement and political participation, or the opening of the professions to their sex. Indeed, advanced female thinkers, like Mary Wollstonecraft, especially praised women’s role as mothers and educators of children: it was for that reason that women deserved the best of education and the highest social respect.”1 Yet time and time again, one finds scholars passively suggesting that Condorcet’s revolutionary views on women were akin to those of other philosophes. In Gita May’s essay, “Rousseau’s ‘Antifeminism Reconsidered,’” she writes that Rousseau’s ideas about women “appear considerably less liberal and enlightened than those of such philosophes as Montesquieu, Diderot, Helvetius and Condorcet.”2 Similarly, David Williams places Condorcet among Holbach and Diderot as three thinkers whose works reflect a growing impetus for “reformative action during the decade prior to 1789” with regards to woman’s place in society.3 In her essay, “The feminism of Condorcet and Sophie de Grouchy,” Barbara Brookes contrasts the feminism of the couple with Montesquieu, Thomas, Diderot and d’Alembert, who, she writes, “were tentative in their claims” and “did not present a coherent sustained argument to counter the prevailing ideas of woman’s assumed biological, and therefore social, inferiority.”4 Brookes, however, does not go far enough. The difference between Condorcet and Sophie’s view on gender equality and the views held by Montesquieu and Diderot could not be further apart. These philosophes not only failed to counter the prevailing prejudices held against women, they actively enforced them!

Another scholar, Siep Stuurman, writes: “Admittedly, most of the eighteenth-century philosophes, with the notable exception of Condorcet, were not such ardent feminists as Poulain, but neither were they outspoken champions of masculine supremacy.” 5 Stuurman’s criticism of the philosophe’s view of women is tepid. To write that they “were not such ardent feminists as Poulain” is a gross understatement. Though scholars today tend to downplay the philosophes’ feminism, too many ignore the unthinking and dangerous prejudices propagated by these beloved thinkers. As will be conveyed in this work, research indicates that most key philosophes were not so much lukewarm feminists as they were outright misogynists. In many instances their thought is hardly distinguishable from prevailing conservative views of the time.

In his work, Stuurman does go on to make the important point that “the Enlightenment should not be reduced to a handful of ‘great philosophers.’” He specifically points to Karen Offen’s work as having shown that “a whole array of feminist arguments, made by women and by men, can be unearthed if one takes the trouble to look beyond the canonical texts.”6 While Stuurman is correct in pointing out the Enlightenment was not just a handful of “great philosophers,” we must nonetheless acknowledge that a handful of thinkers were in fact the heavy-weights of the Enlightenment. Thus, one can not help but to attach a greater level of significance to the things they said (or did not say) since their opinions vastly outweighed the ideas of other lesser-known figures.

When one factors in not only general explication upon the equality of the sexes but also one’s personal dedication to feminism, one’s continued interest in the subject, one’s concentration on not only the abstract concepts but also the practical solutions that could remedy the situation, none among the philosophes, with the exception of Condorcet,and the men in its immediate circle deserve the label, “feminist.” The most important and distinguishing feature of Condorcet’s thought, compared to his Enlightenment counterparts, was his desire to reorganize society such that women could play a more fundamental role in enjoying both the privilege, power, and obligation of operating and living in a community. He wished not only to grant them power but he also felt woman’s shoulders strong enough to carry the obligation that came with it. To support this claim, we will take an in-depth look at the Encyclopédie, followed by an analysis of the individual works of key philosophes, with a particularly concentrated review of Diderot.

The Encyclopédie was to secular philosophy what the Bible was to Christianity. Just as Christian leaders compiled and edited the New Testament in the fourth century, the Apostles of the Age of Reason set forth the salient ideas of secular eighteenth-century thought in the Encyclopédie. Both works were monuments to a new way of interpreting the world. The Encyclopédie, in particular, reached out beyond the philosophes limited intellectual circle and invited the educated public to partake in the exchange of ideas. The work satiated European intellectuals’ appetite, dating back to the seventeenth century, “for a new summa of all branches of knowledge in the light of the major discoveries that had been made in the past one hundred years—a synthesis based upon secular and naturalistic principles rather than upon a traditional theological teology.”7

Upon the publication of its first volume, in June 1751, the Encyclopedia “became the cause celebre in the intellectual world of the century.”8 Richard N. Schwab writes that “[i]mmediately the Encyclopedists were recognized as the chief spokesmen of the philosophes.”9 Thus, the Encyclopédie is perhaps the best source with which to gage the philosophes’ contribution in combating the gender prejudices of their time. Unfortunately, studies of the text reveal that it is surprisingly conservative and lacking, in its treatment of woman’s equality, the virulent anti-prejudice philosophy the philosophes are renowned for. As it turns out, “with the exception, perhaps, of one anonymous contributor, the marquise de Jaucourt, sister-in-law of the chevalier de Jaucourt, all of the Encyclopedists concur in presenting a ‘conservative’ image of woman.”10 Though some argue the Encyclopedists may have colored entries on women with a conservative hue in order to avoid a conflict with censors, in-depth study reveals that the misogynistic tone of the work’s chief contributor, Diderot, matched the misogynistic tone of his individual works. This is true of other contributors as well. In fact, several themes illustrated by the entries match popular conservative attitudes of the time: that women are intellectually and physically inferior creatures which should be pitied; the sex whose duty it is to take care of all domestic duties; the only sex whose reputation is almost solely based on chastity and the maintenance of the perception of sexual virtue.

Furthermore, in light of their having propagated such strident, incisive critiques of superstition and authoritarianism, one must question the viability of the contention that the contributors softened progressive perspectives on women out of fear of a run-in with the censors. One is left with just two credible conclusions: either the misogynic tone that pervades the Encyclopedia reflects the true opinions of its contributors, or the Encyclopedists were far less committed to the cause of woman’s liberation than they were to expanding the power, privilege, and freedom of thought of men – daring in the fight to uproot superstition, timid or disinterested in dethroning sexism. Really one should not be surprised to find that the Encyclopedists agreed with the prevailing mindset view of woman as unequal to man, for at the heart of nearly all of their commentary on women is the view that they are fundamentally different than men. More often than not, woman is defined by weakness and inferiority. Indeed, if the Encyclopédie was a monument to the Enlightenment, it was, by extension, a monument to the shortcomings of the Enlightenment, particularly the misogyny it could not cure in itself.

While the philosophes are often associated with calls for a reformed system of education, Terry Smiley Dock finds that the Encyclopédie itself offers little to nothing in the way of making revolutionary calls or composing radical plans to improve woman’s education. This is true despite the fact that the struggle for improved education and better treatment were prevalent outside of the Encyclopédie: “Outside the Encyclopédie, the cries are louder, the debates longer, the programs concrete.”11 As Dock remarks, “The Encyclopedists who take note of the woeful state of female education are content to bewail this deplorable deficiency.” 12

The Encyclopedists do exhibit a partially progressive attitude toward woman as a physical being. Dock notes that they “decry superstition, recognize the influence of environment on physical development, aspire to ameliorate the lot of mankind, and call men to throw off the yoke of tradition and authority and submit only to the yoke of reason.”13 They treat this task, however, as if it were a humanitarian mission to rescue a poor, otherwise helpless creature. This inference comes from the fact that while they call on men to treat women with greater care, they nevertheless fail to overturn the prejudices, such as the notion that woman was inherently weak and delicate, that preserved if not perpetuated men and women’s master-slave relationship. The Encyclopedists continue to see man as the peak of human potential against which all else should be compared. They view women as necessarily weaker and frailer than men, leading them to believe it was their role to regulate the lives of women.14 Indeed, contributors tend to display a subtle but equally insidious air of superiority toward women.15 As Dock writes, “She is not only classified with the defenseless young and the infirm aged,16 but relegated to the ranks of the mentally inferior where she shares the opprobrium of imbeciles,17 the common herd,18 the gullible and the superstitious,19 and the untutored.”20 Moreover, “Woman is often referred to or dealt with as an object…whose monetary value is half that of a man….”21

Throughout the Encyclopédie there is no shortage of proof of its ominously misogynistic tone. A patriarchal and prejudice paradigm dominates the authors’ treatment of women in the work’s several articles dealing with women, four of which are specifically titled, “Femme.” The longest of the four entries is written by Joseph Francois Eduard Desmahis and measures some six-and-a-half columns. The entry, ‘Femme’ (Morale), contradicts the more liberal views on marriage and equality promulgated in chevalier de Jaucourt articles, “Femme en couche” and “Femme.” Sara Ellen Procious Malueg writes that Desmahis believes that women are “weak, timid, shrewd, false, less capable of attention than men, vicious, vindictive, equivocable, cruel, curious, less capable of friendship with their own sex, living a continual lie called coquetry, vain, superficial, deceitful, inconstant, etc.”22 Boucher d’ Argis’s article, “Femme” (Jurisp.), relays information about the legal status of women in France and the limited circumstances under which they can participate in official affairs. 23 They are disallowed from being “witnesses in wills or before notary publics” but can give depositions. He writes that many believe it takes two women, however, to make one witness. Argis most notably seems to agree with the practice of requiring two women to make one witness.24 He goes on to assert that the fragility and natural delicacy of women bar them from participating in military, Church, and government. 25

To say that the Encyclopedists proffer a conservative tone with regard to women is an understatement. The Encyclopédie, as a matter of fact, abounds with a plethora of gross prejudices against women. The Encyclopedists are practically unanimous in believing “that woman’s constitution is weak”26 and that women are somehow unequal to men.27 Even when Jaucourt notes that nothing prevents men and women from increasing equality within the confines of marriage, he still feels compelled to make it clear men should rule in the public sphere:
…since ordinarily men are more capable than women of controlling important matters, it is very judicious to establish as a general rule that the man’s voice will dominate as long as the principals have not made an agreement to the contrary, because general law comes down from the human institution not from natural law.28

It is no wonder thinkers such as Jaucourt thought women incapable of leadership. Throughout the Encyclopédie women are frequently equated with eunuchs and viewed as defective men. Furthermore, the Encyclopedists site hysteria as a uniquely female disease.29 Menuret de Chambaud cites the ancients in attributing woman’s predisposition to hysteria to “disturbances of the uterus.”30 A doctor of medicine and physician, Chambaud thinks that Hippocrates was correct in asserting that the womb is the cause of nearly all female maladies.31
Despite the contributors’ forward-thinking in matters related to religious toleration or personal freedom, their view of woman’s role in society is conventional and surprisingly near that of the Church. The Encyclopedistsare candid in asserting that woman exists for two principle purposes: giving birth and being a good wife. They repeatedly condemn unnatural miscarriages (abortions)32 and do not even consider the serious reasons why women may have sought to end their pregnancies. Jaucourt lists women’s motivation for having abortions as a desire “to avoid dividing their wealth among several children, to hide their debauchery, to conserve their figures, or to avoid developing a wrinkled belly. The idea that a woman might choose to pursue a career other than mother hood is of course absent.”33 Jaucourt strongly believes it appropriate that laws should govern woman’s body. He argues that government is the key to putting an end to abortions.34 Women are not, however, free of intense scrutiny upon delivering a child into the world. The Encyclopedists go on to decry those women who fail to breastfeed their children. Citing Plutarch and Aulus Gellius, Diderot argues that it is rare for a mother to not nurse her child. He writes that he is unwilling to slander those who do not breastfeed in the way that the Church Fathers have done, but he labels such behavior a travesty, nonetheless. 35 He cites Julius Caesar’s criticism of Roman women who are too busy with leisure to breastfeed, and even suggests mimicking a Turkish law that allotted a greater portion of goods to a woman who breastfed her children.36 The contributors focus almost exclusively on the life of the unborn child and fail to offer woman an opportunity to defend herself.37

While Condorcet is truly vocal on the matter of woman’s choice in matters of pregnancy, he is surprisingly less concerned with the life of the “unborn” versus the quality of life of the already born, an implicitly pro-choice perspective. When writing Progress of the Human Mind, Condorcet theorizes about the importance of society realizing that its first obligation would be to care for the living before the unborn. After conjecturing that human society would likely became successful at progressing in “industry and welfare,” Condorcet notes that a population problem might develop. Condorcet was not, however, concerned. He assumes that by the time the human race had reached such a point, “the progress of reason will have kept pace with that of the sciences, and that the absurd prejudices of superstition will have ceased to corrupt and degrade the moral code by its harsh doctrines instead of purifying and elevating it….” Condorcet assumes that humans will “know that, if they have a duty towards those who are not yet born, that duty is not to give them existence but to give them happiness; their aim should be to promote the general welfare of the human race or of the society in which they live or of the family to which they belong, rather than foolishly to encumber the world with useless and wretched beings.”38